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Consolidation, Coordination, 
Competition, and Coherence: In 
Search of a Forward Looking 
Communications Policy 
Mark D. Director* 
Michael Botein ** 
Coherent national communications policy making has increasingly 
eluded us. Missteps and false steps have impeded progress. The courts, the 
Congress, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or 
Commission) have clashed regularly. The result has been a lack of 
direction, as the involved factions attempt to cope with new technology'S 
unfulfilled promises. 
The challenge for policymakers is to pursue coherent policies in an 
intellectually honest manner. It is an awesome task to reweave the frayed 
fibers of social policy, economic reality, and constitutional constraint; but, 
this is necessary to achieve a strong national communications policy. 
Legislative and regulatory initiatives are valuable in some situations. 
For the foreseeable future, however, it will be more important to examine 
and define fundamental goals rigorously. The sixty-year-old Communica-
tions Act of 1934 (Communications Act or Act) has survived largely intact, 
and it may be able to endure well into the future. In fact, the Act's least 
enduring parts are likely to be the more recent additions-the 1984 and the 
1992 Cable Acts. The latter already supplants much of the former, but both 
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the First and Fifth Amendments loom as potential threats to major portions 
of the latter. 
Enduring policies should be based on considerations beyond current 
events. For example, the recent rash of proposed mega-mergers is not the 
building block for long-term policies. Thankfully, Congress did not rewrite 
the Communications Act as a kneejerk reaction to potential mergers 
between the Baby Bells and cable multisystem operators-a "trend" that 
may have evaporated before it even really emerged. This may serve as a 
lesson about the potential folly of purely reactive legislation in the 
communications sector. To seek a more enlightened future course, we 
should begin by assessing the policy disarray that has been created. 
In the common carrier arena, evolution is stalled. Reviewing courts 
have rejected a number of the Commission's attempts to adopt important 
new policies, most recently concluding that the Commission lacked 
statutory power to exclude nondominant carriers from filing tariffs. I 
Combined with lengthy delays in implementing other significant new rules 
and policies (including, for example, approval of video dialtone applica-
tions), such developments have left the common carrier sector without any 
clear policy direction and with uncertainty about the scope of the agency's 
jurisdiction to regulate changing markets. Broadcasters also have received 
little policy guidance. Constitutional and policy disagreements about 
sexually explicit and violent broadcasting have plagued the industry and 
have consumed an inordinate amount of administrative resources. At the 
same time, efforts to improve children's programming and to assess other 
content-related policies have floundered amid a vigorous battle of advocates 
and major questions about whether (or when) the First Amendment boom 
will be lowered on the Commission's and Congress's restrictions on 
broadcasters. 
Judicial attacks on the comparative hearing process have added 
uncertainty to the traditional licensing scheme.2 Although the FCC has 
continued to relax ownership rules, it has grappled continually with the 
tension between its commitment to ownership diversity and its desire to 
promote broadcasters' potential economies of scale through duopolies and 
multiple ownership. Finally, the networks still confront a confounding 
l. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T, 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994). 
2. Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (vacating and remanding an FCC 
comparative licensing decision with instructions for the agency to consider the applications 
without regard to its policies favoring the integration of ownership and management); see 
also Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (vacating and remanding an earlier 
decision in the same case). 
Number 2] IN SEARCH OF 231 
future. Legal and economic questions breed hesitancy about possible 
multimedia growth strategies.3 
Cable television still labors under probably the most complex and 
least comprehensible communications policy regime. It is hard to predict 
future policy developments for an industry which has endured countless 
policy changes in the four decades of its existence. To confound matters 
further, the Supreme Court's rather obtuse decision in the recent Turner 
Broadcasting case4 is open to at least two contradictory interpretations. 
One portion of the Court's opinion suggests that at least some regulatory 
restrictions on cable television, which would not be permitted if imposed 
on print media, will be permitted-despite the First Amendment-because 
of cable's perceived role as a "gatekeeper."5 The open question is how 
broadly a relaxed level of First Amendment scrutiny will be applied. If it 
were applied as a broad "exception" to cable's general status as a protected 
First Amendment speaker, the rationale would uphold the FCC's regulatory 
thrusts under the 1992 Cable Act. Alternatively, a narrow interpretation of 
this "exception" would allow regulation only where a regulation directly 
addresses cable's "gatekeeper" functions-as in the case of the must-carry 
or third-party access rules. This would subject much (if not most) cable 
regulation to heightened scrutiny under cable's newly affirmed status as a 
protected First Amendment speaker. Under the latter interpretation of the 
Supreme Court's decision, courts could invoke the First Amendment to 
amputate substantial portions of the 1992 Cable Act, thereby restoring the 
industry to its prior less-regulated status-most recently during the second 
h.~lf of the 1980s. The FCC will have to be reactive, rather than proactive, 
~ntil the true meaning of the majority opinion in Turner Broadcasting 
emerges. 
Finally, a variety of still-emerging media have contributed little more 
than a set of additional acronyms--e.g., DBS (direct broadcast satellite), 
MMDS (multichannel multipoint distribution service), ADSL (asymmetric 
3. E.g., In re Evaluation of the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, 8 FCC Rcd. 
3282, reconsideration granted in part, 8 FCC Rcd. 8270 (1993), affd sub nom. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 29 F.3d 309 (7th Cir. 1994) (resulting in the relaxation of the 
financial interest and syndication rules applicable to the networks, and authorizing their 
complete sunset in November 1995, unless an FCC review to be completed in 1995 
determines that the relaxed rules should be retained, in whole or in part). 
, 4. Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, reh 'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 
(199,4). , 
-5:. Id. !it 2466 ("The First Amendment's command that government not impede the 
freedoIll of~peech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private 
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the 
free flow of information and ideas.'). 
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digital subscriber line)-to the jargon. Whether these "fringe" distribution 
media will evolve into significant market forces remains to be seen. What 
is clear, however, is that regulation will not propel them to market 
prominence. 
This lack of direction and the resulting sense of frustration is hardly 
surprising. The conditions for inertia are clear and prevalent. First, the 
government consistently has failed to bring any coherence to the potentially 
conflicting policy goals of encouraging marketplace freedoms and 
regulating in the "public interest." The sixty-year-old Communications Act 
directed the FCC to bring order to a chaotic business through regulation. 
Efforts to preserve licensees' status as "public trustees," however, tend to 
ring hollow amid an industry that has been urged by deregulation, 
constitutional mandate, and economic promise to pursue efficiency and 
profit maximization above virtually all else. 
Perhaps the latest evidence of this is the Turner Broadcasting decision 
itself. Once defended as an essential aspect of the FCC's commitment to 
broadcast localism, the cable must-carry rules now are justified as a 
response to an economically dysfunctional marketplace. Deregulation has 
deprived "localism" of any meaningful content, to the extent that neither 
regulators nor jurists can seriously find a substantial government interest to 
justify a regulation of expression, such as the must-carry rules. The result 
constitutionally elevates broadcasters' balance sheets over the First 
Amendment. Should we permit government regulation of speech to save 
local broadcast television, if we can find little good to say about it? 
Although the Turner Broadcasting decision wraps itself in the appealing 
verbiage of "diversity," the opinion seems to acknowledge that there is 
nothing very diverse about the broadcast services protected by must-carry. 
Although the Fowler FCC argued that the public interest and the profit 
interest were identical, the claim remains the target of significant skepti-
cism. Policies of localism and diversity once appeared to have meaning and 
purpose; they now have been reduced to empty concepts. Today, their 
prime significance is that they may allow a broader range of entrepreneurs 
to profit from media ownership and operation. The benefits of these 
policies for the "public" are open to substantial debate. 
Second, our national communications policymaking apparatus remains 
leaderless; economic goals, more than social policies, dictate its future. 
Government officials advocate their narrow responsibilities; in the 
telecommunications field, agencies' flexibility of action remains subject to 
the constraints of the decade-old AT&T antitrust consent decree-the 
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Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ).6 The changing tides of international 
trade objectives, antitrust enforcement policies, and inconsistent industrial 
policies exert more influence on the direction of national communications 
policy than almost any other principles. Policymakers view communications 
more as a potential engine of economic growth than as a business sector 
that is infused with unique constitutional considerations-all because of the 
vital economic role that information distribution and processing play in 
today's world. 
We may move into the next decade without a significant revision of 
the Communications Act or the adoption of major new national communi-
cations policies. It may be tempting to sit back and let technology and 
economics drive market developments.7 The courts, Congress, the 
Commission, and the Department of Justice could intervene intermittently 
and narrowly to deal with major developments or politically charged 
controversies. After all, we essentially have proceeded this way for years. 
Moreover, other countries have adopted the "U.S. model" in regulating 
newly privatized communications media. 
Before accepting the status quo, however, it may be useful to consider 
how to address, more effectively, four important concepts: consolidation, 
coordination, competition, and coherence. 
Consolidation: There are two critical aspects to this concept. The first 
is concentration of control among industry players. There is uncertainty 
about whether substantial consolidation will or should occur. There is no 
reason to believe, however, that we should have special rules for the media 
to encourage or frustrate consolidation. Antitrust principles will change over 
time in order to properly address new issues. The MFJ has served a 
monumental purpose, but now should be relegated to history, along with 
many of the existing statutory and regulatory ownership limits. The market 
should be more fluid; existing rules often impose rigidity, thus creating 
artificial barriers to assessing reality. 
The second aspect of this concept is the consolidation of me-
dia-including the overused buzzword "convergence." The courts' historical 
approach to creating rigid distinctions among the media-e.g., "scarcity" 
in broadcasting-is obsolete. Electronic media have become increasingly 
6. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), afJ'd sub nom. Maryland 
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
7. European and other national and regional policymakers, by contrast, have attempt-
ed-albeit not always successfully-to adopt new, and potentially far-reaching, policies. For 
example, despite endless squabbling among its member nations, the European Commission 
slowly has begun to develop important new policies in areas such as equipment 
standardization, network interconnection, and carriage of "local" content. 
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transparent. A television set might show the same program from anyone 
of several sources: broadcasting, cable, DBS, MMDS, videocassette, 
videodisc, or compact disc (CD-ROM or CD-I). If the medium once was 
the message, the message is now the message. Accordingly, policies should 
not be defined by the characteristics of the distribution technology; they 
should be expressed more generally and broadly. 
Coordination: The government must make sense of itself, and supply 
some policy leadership. Terminating the MFJ (even if its principles are 
embodied temporarily in laws) will restore the courts to their traditional and 
appropriate role of deciding cases. The government then will have two 
remaining challenges: providing leadership at the national level and 
fostering more effective federal-state partnerships. The European Union 
(EU) has nurtured international cooperation through concepts such as 
"subsidiarity" and "harmonization."g Its relative success is significant, 
because the EU has no tradition of federalism. 
Competition: This is perhaps the most troubled and troublesome 
concept. The country undoubtedly has a commitment to competition as a 
vehicle to realize desirable objectives. At times, however, there has been 
ambivalence about whether competition is a means to an end or an end in 
itself The Communications Act clearly indicates that unbridled competition 
is not always the preferred approach. The basic choice of spectrum 
licensing, rather than a private spectrum market, reflects a legislative 
preference for "managed competition." 
One of the major problems with present competition policy, however, 
is that government authorities lack information as to market forces. For 
example, a merger of a Bell Operating Company and a large cable 
company might be desirable, depending upon the answers to some 
fundamental questions, such as the following: Are a switched/low capacity 
telephone network and an unswitchedlhigh capacity cable system noncom-
petitive? Would a merger create scale economies for the resulting firm? If 
the answer to both questions were in the affirmative, presumably the 
government would allow the merger; if the answers were negative, 
presumably it would not. At present, however, government agencies cannot 
reliably assess these issues. 
If the government stays with its present competition policy, it must 
make rational decisions about how other policies that promote or require 
8. "Subsidiarity" refers to the concept of promoting the implementation ofEU policies 
at the lowest (most decentralized) possible level of government, e.g., at the member-state 
level. "Harmonization" refers to the concept of permitting EU member-states to modifY EU 
directives to suit national conditions, as long as such modifications do not result in a 
departure from the basic thrust of the directive. 
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competition fit with the basic scheme for distributing spectrum. The FCC's 
attempts to "pretend" that there is a vigorously competitive market and to 
make choices based on that assumption have created dysfunction and 
conflict. If more competition is preferable (for whatever reason), then we 
must reevaluate some of the basic principles that have guided the 
communications industry for six decades. For example, in a rough and 
tumble marketplace, historical perspectives on, and regulatory approaches 
toward, ''universal service" and the "public interest" will not work; in fact, 
concerns about these issues may disappear altogether. 
Coherence: Whatever the direction chosen, we will need an under-
standing of the broad impact of our choices. Regulation of cable television 
is simply foolhardy, without acknowledging a rule's effect on cable's 
competitive market position and the government's supposed policy 
commitments to broadband, multimedia networking. Freeing local phone 
companies to enter the video distribution business is a dramatic step with 
possible cataclysmic effects on the entire market. It is encouraging that 
legislators appear attuned to the broader implications of this policy choice, 
and are considering widespread changes to provide guidance for future 
action. 
Coherence should not be equated with equivalence or even-handed-
ness. Coherence demands not a "level playing field," but rather an honest 
recognition that seemingly narrow policy choices can have widespread 
effects. It requires a real effort to reconcile the effects of differing policies. 
We may well find compelling reasons to distinguish among differing 
activities and to apply distinct policies to them. At the very least, however, 
we should be honest and forthright about the distinctions, and realistic 
about the potential constitutional constraints. Again, we need more detailed 
data and analysis. 
From all indications, we have entered an era of abundance. More 
frequencies are being allocated, and spectrum generally is being used more 
intensively and efficiently. Distribution facilities are being constructed at 
an unparalleled pace; the news of the death of alternative distribution 
pipelines is both premature and exaggerated. The emergence of new media 
may result in the entry of major new market participants. With less 
regulation and more outlets, the opportunity for increasingly diverse content 
has grown. Whether the opportunity will be seized, however, remains to be 
seen. 
Our policies have grown out of scarcity and a fear of market 
dominance. In some cases, often inconsistently, we have adopted policies 
to address abundance rather than scarcity. Broad reassessment and 
reappraisal seem appropriate. The challenge for the next decade will be to 
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move from the management of a scarce and powerful resource to the 
exploitation of a more abundant and even more powerful one. For the 
policymaker, the central task will be trying to allocate-or at least oversee 
and channel-the benefits of abundance. 


